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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN H. CHASE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
vs. Case No. 7363 
KIRBY S. DAWSON and ELINOR 
W. DAWSON, his wife, 
Defendants arnd .Ap(pellants 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
The respondent feels that the Statement of the Case 
of the appellants is vague, uncertain, and to a certain 
extent confusing. Also, the appellants, in their index, 
have set up the following points: 
''Denial by the court of motion to strike 
from the complaint matter not alleged in the 
notice of lien. 
''Overruling demurrer to complaint. 
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''Overruling objection to Exhibit A, the no-
tice of lien sued upon. 
''Making findings of fact not alleged in the 
notice of lien. 
''Making findings of fact not alleged in the 
complaint or the notice of lien. · 
''That the judgment is against law. 
and gave no page number which would enable the res'P'on-
dent or court to correlate definitely the points with the 
argument. 
On page 1, they set out what they claim are the 
three fundamental questions in the case, a.s follows: 
1. 'The sufficiency of the notice of claim of 
lien relied upon by the respondent. 
2. The right of the claimant's assignee to 
change, amend, add to or enlarge ·such 
claim by allegations in his complaint. 
3. To further change, amend, add to or en-
large such claim by either evidence, or the 
findings of fact, after the case is closed 
and submitted.'' 
So, the writ'er feels that it is absolutely necessary 
to examine this case and determine just exactly the point 
or points to be argued. 
RESPONDENT'S: !S.TATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On October 14, 1948, the plaintiff, as the assignee 
of one George 0. Chase, filed his complaint in the Dis-
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trict Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah (R. 1-3), 
to foreclose a mechanic's lien on defendants' property. 
The complaint is set out in appellants' brief on pages 
2 and 3. The defendants then demurred generally to 
plaintiff's complaint (R. 7), and filed their notice of in-
tention to strike (R. 8) from Paragraph 2 of plaintiff's 
complaint that which is here italicized: 
"That on or about the 21st day of October, 
1947, at Salt Lake City, Utah, George 0. Chase, 
doing business as the Chase Lumber and Hard-
ware Company, ·entered into an oral agreement 
with one J. S. Livingston, .a contractor employed 
by the defendants, whereby it was agreed that 
the said George 0. Chase furnish materials for a 
home for defendants located on the land herein-
after described, and that the agreed price of 
$208.93 would be paid for said materials.'' 
That on December 7, 1948, the Honorable Roald A. 
Hogenson, one of the judges of the District Court of 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, entered his order over-
ruling defendants' demurrer and denying their motion 
to strike (R. 10). The defendants, on December 21, 1948, 
filed their answer to plaintiff's complaint ( R. 13). Their 
answer admitted that plaintiff and defendants were resi-
dents of Salt Lake County, Utah, and defendants. owned 
the premises referred to in the complaint. They admitted 
the filing of a pretended notice of lien, but denied that 
the instrument or copy of the lien attached to the com-
plaint was a true copy of the record filed by George 0. 
Chase. For lack of information, they denied all other 
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allegations in the complaint and asked for $25.00 at-
torney's fees. 
On February· 14, 1949, the pre-trial was had before 
the Honorable J. Allan Crockett, and the court at that 
time received in evidence the photostatic copy of the 
notice of lien, which is marked Exhibit ''A.'' 
The trial of the cause came on before the Honorable 
J. Allan Crockett on the 23rd day of February, 1949, at 
which time the defendants' attorney objected to the intro-
duction of the photostatic copy of the lien upon the 
grounds as follows: 
"MR. WIGHT: We will object to it on the 
grounds that it is incompetent, that it isn't the 
notice of lien copied and attached to the com-
plaint, that it is wholly insufficient for the pur-
pose of creating a lien, and, in particular, it 
doesn't state whether the claimant was the ori-
ginal or a sub-contractor, and, if a sub-contractor, 
the name of the original contractor with whom he 
made his contract. 
"It doesn't state the nature of the materials 
furnished or to whom they were delivered or 
that they were to be used in the construction, 
alteration, addition to or repair of building, struc-
ture, or addition to a building structure or im-
' ' provement upon the land owned by the defendants 
against which the lien is sought to be imprest · 
d ' h . ' · oesn t state t e nature of the Improvement nor 
the terms and conditions of the contract under 
which the materials wer;e furnished. 
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''Now, if your Honor please, this is going 
to be the question in the case, and about the only 
question in the case. 
"THE COURT: Well, now, let's do .this 
thing, shall we~ Let's get all the evidence in, 
then discuss the law of the case, shall we~ 
"MR WIGHT: I don't know, so far aa we 
are concerned, we're not disputing the delivery 
of the materials to the place ; we're not disputing 
the fact that the-there was a notice of lien filed, 
and that the notice is the photostatic copy-that 
is, the photostatic copy is a true copy of the re-
corded notice, and, I take it, that you won't dis-
pute that the Dawsons paid Mr. Livingston in 
full for the house." (R. 34-35) 
That thereafter Exhibit "B," being the delivery 
sheets of the materials used in defendants' home, was 
introduced in evidence, and Exhibit '' C, '' the ledger 
sheet of George 0. Chase for J. S. Livingston, was intro-
duced in evidence, and Exhibit '' D, '' the delivery sheets 
of certain deliveries made by Chase to Livingston which 
were not claimed to be an obligation of the Dawsons. 
The defendants admitted the assignment of George 0. 
Chase to John Chase (R. 38). 
Later the following took place: 
'' MR McCARTY: Now, will you admit that 
the material was used in the house, was delivered 
up there~ 
"THE COURT: He did state, I think, you 
don't dispute the delivery to the Dawsons ~ 
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"MR. WIGHT: We don't dispute it, but 
we want the evidence to go in subject to the ob-
jection we ha:ve already made. 
"MR. McCARTY: I understand that. 
"THE COURT: You are not disputing it, 
and he repr•esented it to be a fact, we will take 
it to be a fact that the materials referred to were 
delivered upon the Dawson house and used there-
in. 
"MR. McCARTY: Yes; well, I guess that 
is our case. 
''MR. WIGHT : We rest, your Honor please. 
''MR. McCARTY: We rest, and I'll excuse 
both of my witnesses and excuse my other wit-
ness." (R. 39) 
The court again stated to the defendants' attorney 
that he wished to 'P'llt it in the record that if the notice 
of lien, a copy of which is Exhibit ''A,'' is sufficient in 
law, the plaintiff is entitled to recover as prayed in 
the complaint. Defendants' attorney stated he would 
not like to make a stipulation that way, he did not dis-
pute the fact that the materials were delivered and that 
the notice of lien was filed in the form shown by Ex-
hibit "A." Defendants' attorney did not come out di-
rectly for some time and say that the only issue in the 
case was the sufficiency of the lien, and finally the 
court stated as follows : 
''THE COU_R.T: So that, in all respects, ex-
cept for the suff1mency of the lien, you are satis-
fied, and that-I will state it as I did before-and 
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I don't want to be unfair with you-if that is 
unfair with you, correct me-that you rest your 
defense solely upon the sufficiency of the lien~ 
"MR. WIGHT: Yes. 
"THE COURT: And, if it is sufficient in 
law, the plaintiff should recover what he prayed 
for in his complaint~ 
"MR. WIGHT: I don't want to go that far. 
''THE COURT: Well, all right. 
"~IR. WIGHT: I will stipulate that the-
that we rest our defense solely upon the suffi-
ciency of the lien." (R. 42) 
The court thereupon overruled defendants' objec-
tion to the admission of the lien, Exhibit ''A,'' in evi-
dence and admitted the same in evidence. That there-
after, on the 30th day of March, 1949, the Honorable J. 
Allen Crockett entered judgment in favor of plaintiff 
and against the defendants as prayed. Findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and judgment were submitted to the 
court on the 5th day of April, 1949, by the plaintiff, and 
that thereafter the defendants filed their objections to 
the proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and 
judgment (R. 22'). Among the obj.ections was that there 
was no evidence introduced in regard to attorney's fees. 
The hearing on the objections came up before the Honor-
8.ble J. Allen Crockett on the 23rd day of April, 1949, 
at which time the court reopened on his own motion the 
case to allow evidence as to attorney's fees, at which time 
the plaintiff's attorney called some witnesses, but at 
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that time the defendants, through their counsel, sti~ 
ulated that $25.00 would be a reasonable attorney's fee 
for either counsel in the matter, and thereupon the court 
signed the findings of fact, conclusions of law and judg-
ment. 
POINTS TO BE ARGUED 
The respondent feels that there is one sole point to 
be considered, that is : 
WAS THE NOTICE OF LIEN, EXHIBIT "A," 
SUFFICIENT TO SATI:S1FY THE STATUTE~ 
The respondent will break down his argument into 
two subdivisions : 
a. The lien law is remedial, and substantial com-
pliance therewith is sufficient. 
b. The notice of lien, Exhibit ''A,'' substantially 
complied with the statute. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE LIEN LAW IS REMEDIAL, AND SUBSTANTIAL 
COMPLIANCE THEREWITH IS SUF:FICIENT. 
The mechanic's lien law proceeds upon the theory 
that the laborer and the materialman have an equitable 
right to follow their labor and materials into the build-
ing of which they have become a component part, and to 
have a lien on it because the building contains in it such 
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labor and material. The lien claimant is, of course, en-
titled to receive compensation for his labor and materials 
from those contractually obligated to him, a right which 
is in no way dependant upon a lien or mechanic's lien 
law, and the mechanic's lien law has in addition super-
added a new security. As the lien is of purely statutory 
origin, the statute must be examined to determine both 
the right and mode by which it can be secured. While 
this is true, the lien is favored; the law relating thereto 
is remedial in character, and should be liberally con-
strued with a view to effect its object and promote jus-
tice. The courts will not give the law a construction 
tending by its technicality to fritter away, impair or 
destroy the benign objects arrived at in its adoption. 
The liberal construction is favored by the courts of 
most States, and the old rule of strict compliance with 
the statute is favored by only a few courts. The appell-
ants have picked out a few of the strict compliance 
cases. 
The notice of lien, as in this case, is usually prepared 
by an artisan or materialman, who is not skilled in the 
niceties of law or the use of technical phrases. The 
courts have realized this and have been loath to deny 
relief because of some slight imperfection, and the courts 
have regard to substance rather than form. 
Volume 36 America;n Jurisprude,nce, page 91, Sec-
tion 126, ''Mechanic's Liens'': 
''In order to be sufficient, the lien notice 
must comply with the statutory provisions. How-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
ever, the pertinent facts in such not~c~ need not be 
set forth or stated with the definiteness of a 
pleading; a substantial compliance, in good_ fait~, 
with the requirements of the statutes being In 
these respects sufficient.'' 
That is the general statement of the law, both by 
the text book writers and the courts. 
The case of Ford v. Sp,ringer Land Association, 41 
P. 541 (New Mexico, 1895), is one of the early western 
cases that held that the mechanic's lien law, in view 
of the equitable character of the statute, should be lib-
erally construed, but cannot by construction be extended 
to cases not provided for by statute. The case also holds 
that the notice of claim of lien, being the foundation of 
the action, must contain all the essential requirements 
of the statute, and a failure or omission on the part of the 
person claiming the lien of any of the substantial re-
quisites of the ·statute is fatal and will defeat the action. 
This case was aT>pealed to the Supreme Court of the 
United States, and may be found in 168 U.S. 513, 18 
Sup. Ct. 170, 42 U.S. (L. Ed.) 562. T~e Supreme Court 
in that case held that substantial compliance, in good 
faith, with the requirement of the mechanic's lien laws 
is sufficient, and the test of such compliance is to be 
found in the statute embracing such laws. 
It was held in Salt Lake Hardware Co. v. ChaiJrmarn 
Min. etc. Co., 137 Fed. 632: 
"It is true that the right to enforce a me-
chanic's lien depends upon a compliance with the 
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requirements of the statute. Technical accuracy, 
however, is not required. The courts hold that 
a substantial compliance is all that is essential." 
Bloom on Laws of ill echanic' s Liens, on page 304, 
states: 
"It is not required therefore that the claim 
shall contain a statement of all the facts essential 
to establish the lien; whether, for instance, the 
facts being truly stated, as required by the statute, 
the person in possession of the property or the 
person by whom the laborer was employed had 
authority to bind the owner, as agent, is a matter 
for allegation and proof at .the trial.'' 
Sec. 371. ''A substantial compliance with the 
statute as to the claim of lien is all that is re-
quired. It has been said that the provisions of 
.the code relative thereto are to be liberally con-
strued with a view to effect their objects and to 
promote justice and .substance rather than form 
is to be regarded. In this connection the court 
said, 'We are certainly not disposed to defeat 
the lien by a nice criticism of the language in 
which the lien is set forth.' '' 
Citing: Wood v. Wiede, 46 Cal. 637. Malone v. Big 
Flat C. M. Co., 76 Cal. 578, 18 P. 772. Oast,agnetto v. 
Coppertown M. & 8. Co., 146 Cal. 329,80 P. 74. 
Trout v. Siegel, et ~al. (Calif., 1927), 262 P. 320, 
quotes with approval from Wagner v. R(l;nSen, (Calif.) 
37 P. 195: 
'' 'The purpose of the record and statement 
must be to inform the owner, in case of a con-
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tractor and laborers rendering service under such 
contract as to the extent and nature of a lienor's 
claim, to facilitate investigation as to its 
merits.' '' 
'See also: D~ake Lumber Co. v. Ditnrdquist, et al. 
(Ore., July 2, 1946), 170 P. (2d) 712. 
In the case of Interooiastal Lumber Distributors v. 
D·eriarn (Pennsylvania, 1935), 178 Atl. 350, it is stated: 
''Adherence to the terms of the statute 
is indispensable, but the rule must not be pushed 
into such niceties as serve but to perplex and em-
barrass a remedy intended to be simple and sum-
mary, without in fact adding anything to the 
security of the parties having an interest in the 
building sought to be encumbered. We must no.t 
be hyper-critical when scanning this species of 
lien and estimating its sufficiency. Such a prac-
tice must necessarily defeat a very large major-
ity of them; a result not to be desired where they 
furnish sufficient data to enable the parties sub-
ject to them to ascertain all that is essential for 
them to know. It would be idle to suggest that 
the owner of this building, from an inspection of 
the paper filed, would not know the person alleged 
to be the contractor." 
See also: 57 C.J.S., page 672. 
Utah is committed to the same liberal construction. 
Justice Frick, in Park Oity Meat Co. v. Oomstoek Silver 
Mining Co., 36 U. 145, 103 P. 254, states: 
''The more modern decisions however are to 
the eff·ect that mechanic's lien 'statutes 'should 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
receive a fair and reasonable, if not a liberal, con-
struction, with a view to preserving their spirit 
and effectuating their purposes.'' 
Justice Frick again, in the case of Eccles v. Martin, 
31 U. 2-U, 87 P. 713, quotes from 20 Am. & Eng. Ency. 
Law, on page 276, and says: 
''A lien once acquired by labor performed on 
a building with the consent of the owner should 
not, however, be defeated by technicalities, when 
no rights of others are infringed, and no express 
command of the statute is disregarded.'' 
Another Utah case, Elw·ell v. Morros, 28 U. 278, 78 
P. 605, states: 
''The weight of authority is to the effect that 
the well-established :rule that remedial provisions 
of the statutes are to be liberally construed ap\... 
plies to, and should be followed in, proceedings to 
foreclose mechanic's liens." 
See also: Rockel on Mechanic's Liens, page 258, 
Sec. 100, and page 284. Brubaker v. Bennett, 19 U. 401, 
57 P. 170. 
The case of Morrison-Merrill v. Willard, 17 U. 306, 
53 P. 833, cited by appellants on page 12 of their brief, 
also holds that substantial compliance with the statute 
is all that is necessary. 
There ia no question whatsoever but that Utah has 
adopted the liberal construction of the lien law. 
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B. THE NOTICE OF LIEN, EXHIBIT "A," SUBSTAN-
TIALLY COMPLIED WITH THE STATUTE. 
To consider this properly, we must look to the stat-
ute and to the lien, Exhibit ''A,'' itself. 
Section 52-1-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1943: 
''Contractors, subcontractors and all persons 
performing labor upon, or furnishing materials to 
be used in, the con8truction or alteration of, or 
addition to, or repair of, any building, structure 
or improvement upon land * * * shall have a 
lien upon the property upon or concerning which 
they have rendered service, performed labor o_r 
furnished materials, for the value of the s·ervice 
rendered, labor performed or materials furnished 
by each respectively, whether at the instance of 
the owner or of any other person acting by his 
authority as agent, contractor or otherwise." 
Section 52-1-7, Ut.a.h Code Annotated, 1943: 
"Every original contractor within eighty days 
after the completion of his contract, and every 
per8on exce'{lt the original contractor claiming 
the benefit of this chapter within sixty days after 
furnishing the last material or performing the 
last labor for any building, improvement or struc-
ture, or for any alteration, addition to or repair 
thereof, or performance of any labor in, or furn-
ishing any materials for, any mine or mining 
claim, must file for record with the county re-
corder of the county in which the property or 
some .P~trt there~f, is situated a claim in writing, 
containing a notice of intention to hold and claim 
a lien, and a statement of his demand after de-
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ducting all just credits and offsets, with the name 
of the owner, if known, and also the name of the 
person by whom he was employed or to whom he 
furnished the material, with a statement of the 
ter1ns, time given and eonditions of his contract, 
specifying the time when the first and last labor 
was performed, or the first and last material was 
furnished, and also a description of the property 
to be charged with the lien, sufficient for identifi-
cation, which claim must be verified by the oath 
of himself or of .some other person.'' 
The notice of lien, Exhibit ''A,'' is set out below. 
It appeared on a printed form. The portions filled in by 
the lien claimant are italicized. 
NOTICE OF LIEN 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
Notice is hereby given that the undersigned, 
George 0. Chase, ·dba Chase Lumber and Hard-
wa;re doing business as ---------------- and residing at 
Salt Lake City County of Salt Lake State of Utah, 
hereby claims and intends to hold and claim a lien 
upon that certain land and premises, owned and 
reputed to be owned by Kirby S. Dawson 1and 
Elinor W. Dawson, his wife, and situate, lying 
and being in Salt Lake City, County of Salt Lake, 
State of Utah, described as follows, to-wit: 1424 
South 14th East Street, South 1f2 of Lot 23 and 
North 1f2 of Lot 24, Block 6, LIBERTY HEIGHTS 
to secure the payment of the sum of One Hun-
dred Fifty Seven ~and 16/100 Dollars, owing to the 
undersigned for material as a lumber ·and ha.rd-
ware dealer in, on and about the house on said 
land. 
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That the said indebtedness accrued and the 
undersigned furnished said materials to Kirby 
8. Dawson, who was the owner and the reputed 
owner of said premises as aforesai~, under a. ~tral 
contract made between the said Ktrby 8. Lwtng-
ston and the undersigned on the 21st day of Oc._ 
tober, 1947, by the terms of which the undersigned 
did agree to deliver material to solid premises 
and the said Kirby 8. Dawson did agree to pay 
the undersigned therefor as follows, to-wit: Cash 
and under which said contract the undersigned 
did ddiver the first material on the 21st day of 
October, 1947 and did deliver the last material 
on the 24th day of Octobe.r, 1947 and on and be-
tween said last mentioned days, did deliver 1rUlr-
terial amounting to the sum of Two Hwndred 
Eight and 93/100 Dollars, which was the reason-
able value thereof, and on which the following 
payments have been made to-wit: $51.77 leaving 
a balance owing to the undersigned of $i57.16 
Dollars after deducting all just credits and offsets, 
and for which demand the undersigned holds and 
claims a lien by virtue of the provisions of Chap-
ter 1, of Title 52, of the Revised Statutes of Utah, 
1933. 
(s) GEORGE 0. CHASE 
(verified on reverse side) 
The respondent claims, on page 9 of his brief, that 
the notice of lien omitted to state five essential aver-
ments: 
1. The nature and amount of the material fur-
nished by the claiment. 
2. The use to which they were to be applied. 
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3. To whom they were delivered. 
4. The terms, time given and conditions of the 
contract under which they were furnished. 
5. That Livingston, with whom he made his con-
tract, was acting as agent, contractor or otherwise auth-
orized by appellants to make such contract in their be-
half. 
Taking them in order: 
1. The notice of lien, Exhibit ''A,'' states that it 
was for material a.s a lumber and hardware dealer. The 
appellants did not state wherein those words were insuf-
ficient. Does the lien have to set out with particularity 
the number of shingles furnished, as in this case, or the 
number of buckets of tar f The lien claimant furnished 
material as a hardware and lumber dealer, which went 
into the house on the property on which he claimed the 
lien. It was not incumbent on the lien claimant in his 
notice of lien to furnish an itemized list of each and every 
article that was delivered. On some construction jobs a 
lien would require hundreds of pages were such the ca:.se. 
2. Appellants complain that we did not have in the 
notice of lien the use to which they were to be applied. 
I do not believe that there is a case, even in the States 
which hold strict compliance necessary, that goes so 
far that you have to state the use to which materials 
were to be applied. It i.s sufficient if they are delivered 
to the premises for that purpose, and the notice of lien 
shows that it was for material in and about the house on 
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said land. The proof, of course, in this case shows both 
by stipulation of counsel and also by the delivery sheets, 
Exhibit '' B '' that the material was delivered and ac-
' cepted by the appellants, and it was admitted in evidence 
that the material was used in the house ( R. 39). The 
notice of lien, of course, must be taken in its entirety, 
and the lien says that they are filing a lien to secure 
the payment of money owing to the lien claimant for 
material as a lumber and hardware dealer in and about 
the house on said land. ·Then it goes on to say that the 
indebtedness accrued and the lien claimant furnished 
materials to Kirby S. Dawson, who was the owner of 
said premises, under a contract made with Kirby S. 
Livingston, and that the lien claimant did deliver the 
material to said premises, and the appellant, Kirby S. 
Dawson, agreed to pay cash, and the notice of lien goes 
on to say when the first material and the last material 
were delivered by the lien claimant. Taking the lien in 
its entirety, it clearly shows that the material was de-
livered to the premises to be used in and about the house 
thereon, and the respondent respectfully contends that 
the hypercritical and baseless objections of appellants 
on this point ·should be disregarded. 
3. The appellants complain because the notice of 
lien did not mention that the materials were delivered to 
a certain person. The notice of lien sets out that they 
furnished materials to the appellants and that the ma-
terials were delivered to the premises, and that the 
appellant, Kirby S. Dawson, agreed to pay for them. 
What could be clearer~ Suppose under a contract of 
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this nature some one delivered the material to the prem-
ises and they were accepted by a stranger. Muot the 
lien set out the stranger's name 1 Certainly not. In this 
case, the proof, Exhibit '' B,'' showed that the materials 
were delivered to the appellants. 
4. The appellants complain that the notice of lien 
did not set out the term, time given and conditions of 
the contract under which the materials were furnished. 
Then they quote an old case of Hooper v. Flood, 54 Cal. 
218, wherein it is held that the otatement that the terms 
of the contract "were and are cash" was insufficient. 
The case referred to is poorly reasoned, and has never 
been given consideration as a precedent. In Exhibit ''A,'' 
the notice says that by the terms of which the under-
signed did agree to deliver material to said premises and 
the said Kirby S. Dawson did agree to pay the under-
signed therefor as follows, to-wit: "Cash." "Cash" is a 
common word, and the term generally means that the 
account shall be paid immediately upon delivery. It 
is the antonym of "credit." The case cited by appell-
ants was definitely overruled in its definition of 'cash' 
by the case of Parrish v. Arne.rican Ry. Employees' 
Corp., (Dist. Ct. of Appeals, Calif., 1927), 256 P. 590: 
'' 'Cash' in its ordinary sense is an antonym 
of 'credit' as generally understood and defined 
by the courts.'' 
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Hartwig v. Rushifn.g (Ore., 1919), 182 P.177: 
''Ordinarily the word 'cash' means ~oney, 
but it is frequently used as a term meanmg the 
opposite of credit." 
See also : Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, 
Vol. 6, page 246, '' Cash.'' 
5. The appellants further complain that it does 
not set out that Livingston was acting as agent, contrac-
tor or otherwise authorized by appellants to make a 
contract in their behalf. Considering Exhibit ''A,'' the 
notice of lien, in its entirety, it c~rtainly does show that 
Livingston had the authority. He made the contract and 
Dawson agreed to pay for it. It would be ridiculous to 
assume that a man would agree to pay for something 
that he did not authorize. However, the law is also 
against appellants' contention. 
In the case of Da;vis-He.nderson Lumber Co. v. GoU-
schall et al., (Sup. Ct. Calif., 1889), 22 P. 860, on page 
862, it says : 
''There is nothing in the section or in any 
other that requires the materialman to state in 
his claim of lien what relationship the person 
to whom he furnished the materials bore to the 
owners.'' 
See also: Castagne.tto v. Coppertown M. & S. Co., 
146 Cal. 329, 80 P. 74. Ingersoll et a.l. v. Chaplin et al., 
(Calif., 1932) 15 P. (2) 790. Drake Lumber Co. v. Lind-
quist et a.l., (Ore., July 2, 1946) 170 P. (2) 712. 
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Our statute does not require that authority to be 
set out in the lien. In this case, the notice of lien cer-
tainly furnished the appellants sufficient data to enable 
them to ascertain all that was essential for them to know. 
In this case from beginning to end the aJ;>pellants have 
sought to escape their just liability by endeavoring to 
create trivial technicalities and by blandly stating that 
the notice of lien lacked certain elements which on inspec-
tion proved to be there. 
On page 9 of appellants' brief (I hope the court 
has page 9 in its copies; it is lacking in one of the re-
spondent's), the appellants quoted from Bloom's LO!W 
of Mechanic's Liens, section 411 : 
"Where a claim of lien is uncertain it will 
be construed against the claimant.'' 
Upon an examination of this section and the cases cited, 
it will be found that the case held that where a lien claim-
ant claimed for materials or work furnished from about 
July 1st, he could not go prior to that date in his proof 
in the case. In other words, if in the instant case re-
spondent had claimed ,about $150.00 as the amount due, 
he could not have recovered a bit more than the $150.00. 
This section does not mean that if there is an uncer-
tainty in the claim for lien the lien will be declared in-
valid, but merely that the uncertainty will be decided 
as against the lien claimant. In fact, Exhibit'' A'' satis-
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fied the authority cited and quoted by appellants on page 
10 of their brief, Jornes on niens, 3d edition, section 1391: 
''The form of the notice or claim is imma-
terial, provided it complies substantially w?-th 
all the requirements of the statute. Everythrng 
"required by the .statute should be stated with 
reasonableness and certainty of language.'' 
Thus, it will be seen upon a careful scrutiny of Ex-
hibit" A," every technicality that appellant.3 are depend-
ing upon to defeat respondent's claim fades into nothing-
ness. The notice of lien substantially complied with the 
statute in every respect. 
CONCLUSION 
Two district court judges held that Exhibit ''A,'' 
the notice of lien, substantially complied with the statute 
and was sufficient in law upon which to base respondent's 
recovery. (R. 10 and 42) The appellants in this court 
have failed in their brief to point out in any way wherein 
the notice of lien was not in substantial compliance with 
the statute. Even the authorities cited by the appellants 
fail to sustain their position. 
Therefore, respondent respectfully submits that the 
judgment of the lower court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAYS. McCARTY 
Atto.rney for Plaintiff 
and Respondent 
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